I've recently finished reading 'On Liberty' by Mill. Every few years I find myself re-reading this book. I profoundly agree with Mill, and spend most of the reading experience either nodding my head in agreement or shaking at some irritation alongside Mill.
Originally published in 1859, it is an perceptive analysis of the human condition with regards to our thought-process and the way we treat others who stand in opposition to the consensus.
When I first read 'On Liberty', I remember finding the prose rather turgid - if not verbose; but I've now come to really enjoy his literary style. Mill has a lovely literary style - which makes me feel he's speaking and narrating. His otherwise discursive narrative obscures the concision with which his forceful philosophical points are couched. Indeed, so much so, that the book is immensely quotable. This is not a treatise, instead it takes the form of an extended essay and relates to his general utilitarianism ideology. I think its the brevity of 'On Liberty' which imbues it with its enduring aphoristic quality.
Core arguments
Mill argues that people are accustomed to believe that their "feelings are better than reasons" and that tolerance only operates as a prisoner's dilemma type of situation. So natural to humankind is intolerance that its only when the cost of philosophical or political quarrels becomes costly, that a truce of-sorts prevails: "the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves".
The preservation of liberty entails limits on government action. But, as I write this, I feel some despondency. Our world is radically different to Mill's account - most conspicuously during covid-19. So much so, that reading Mill feels, to me, rather quaint. Today, government is viewed - not with any suspicion - but with an air of an expectation. The expectation of intervening in almost every issue and to 'deal' with every 'crisis'. Governments are expected to furnish solutions to all aspect of life - even the insoluble one. At least Mill's era involved some inherent realisation as to the limits of government. Nevertheless, Mill writes that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others". This outlines his classic harm principle: "his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" to exercise power over him. But, the concept of what amounts to harm, more often than not, is precisely a person's own good (with the difference that today, it is repackaged as the well-being of others).
Nevertheless, as a starting proposition, he argues that people should be able to determine their own lives as it suits their characters. He presents four classic arguments.
1. Firstly, as a result of own non-infallibility, I have no more rational weight to impede the expression of opinions contrary to my own – than they would have to impede my own opinion. That is true of homosexuality, racism, prostitution, transgenderism etc. as being acceptable. As a matter of first principles, a person has no more rational weight for finding it acceptable than someone else holding the contrary. It is simply a point of view which is often held very strongly to such an extent that disagreement is automatically deemed as being 'wrong'. Mill argues that our infallibility ought to make us rein in the stifling of opinions that do not mirror our own - often the regnant orthodoxy. In so doing, Mill argues that humanity would be hurting itself. He says: "they have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging". He argues eloquently that depriving a counter-position involves humanity losing "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth".
2. Secondly, we have a duty to form our own opinions on subjects in life. To that extent, it is cowardice to withdraw and recoil from meaningfully acting on our earnest opinions. "People, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true", and it makes all the difference between assuming the truth for lack of refutation and not permitting its refutation.
In my view, Mill touches on a deeply held insecurity often lurking beneath the surface vis-a-vis the censorious; namely, their anxiety about being challenged. Mill argues that a confident opinion ought to involve a "standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded".
Mill rebukes the perceived impiety that may surround some given opinion; i.e. by "preventing the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility". He cites Socrates and the putative impiety of challenging the gods of the state and as the 'corrupter of the youth'. He cites Calvary, and the Sanhedrin putting Christ to death in genuine outrage at his impiety. The greatest harm, he says, is the reasoning that is cowed for fear of heresy. Truth gains more by people who earnestly think for themselves than those who "suffer themselves to think". An atmosphere of mental slavery. Without challenge, opinions morph into a "dead dogma, not a living truth". Its comprehension and rationality will wither, and any heartfelt and earnest conviction becomes a luxury. Elsewhere he argues that an aspect of individuality is originality, otherwise "human life would becomes a stagnant pool". As such, he reminds society that we should encourage people who think differently.
My own university boasts a world renowned status; and yet, last year, Kathleen Stock and Helen Joyce were abused and attempts were made to silence them and prevent fellow students from hearing their opinions. Mill's stagnancy seems fitting.
3. Thirdly, quoting Cicero, "he who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that". By throwing ourselves into the mental position of those who think differently, we may overlook refining the truth. Referring to the Socratic method, he makes clear an obvious point which is that any prevailing orthodoxy is rarely the whole truth. It is via the collision of adverse opinions on which truth is ultimately furnished. He says quite beautifully:
If there are any persons who contest a received opinion ... let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought.
This line is almost utopian. Have we ever lived in a world in which opinions are vigorously and honestly contested? Our opinions are tribal and held for the sake of vanity or peer-pressure. I really don't think we are a species that can think for itself. As much as I admire and love Mill's book, I increasingly feel that our culture would mock these points and, to that extent, it feels irrelevant to our world. There feels like an ever concentrated set of social and cultural orthodoxies; and against which, diversity and tolerance are regarded with suspicion and hostility.
4. Finally, Mill cautions us from "stigmatising those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men". Mill argues that this argument is one-sided; i.e. the side with the comforting majority. The minority cannot attack the prevailing consensus as immoral or wicked etc. Similar to the ad hominem, Mill urges readers to restrain vituperation and such offensive attacks. On the other side, he cautions the minority position.
He argues that the expression of ideas is not without consequence or cost. By insulting a man's mother, I cannot expect or demand no consequences. A person who articulates an unorthodox or heretical view must be mindful of the way they comport themselves. They cannot demand no cost.
The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost.
Conclusion
There are some interesting tangential points. Mill seems to adopt a Lockian conceptions of rights which is qualified vis-a-vis children (up to the legal age). Liberty is defined negatively by 'failing to help his brother'. I am quite pleased to see Mill discounted the fanciful notion of the 'social contract' and maintained some, admittedly vague, conception of mutual responsibility between individuals and the community. These sentiments reflect an approach to liberty that deserves its own post. Moreover, there was a fascinating remonstration against Christian precepts which I quite enjoyed and may need to be fleshed out and analysed in more detail in a future post.
Ultimately, this is an excellent work which distills the need to acknowledge the flourishing of individual dignity through the liberty of the individual.
