The Trump-Putin ceasefire meeting

As we stand today, it seems to me that the Western nations have to choose between:

1. Accepting some sort of Russian de facto occupation of Ukraine territory, or
2. Getting more seriously involved militarily in the Russia-Ukraine war.

By now, both sides are entrenched and offensive measure are seriously expensive. We can already see this with Russia - they are still pushing forward in a few areas at a snail pace & suffering high casualties. Even so, Russia has the upper hand on the battlefield. Only last month, Russia’s 90th tank regiment entered Dnipropetrovsk. This is the first time Moscow’s land forces entered the region since the early months of the war.

It doesn’t seem ethically defensible for Western allies to insist on dragging on the war much longer with American and European powers only speaking of imposing further sanctions. If anything, sanctions don’t seem to have much of an effect on Kremlin’s war footing. The Ukrainian army is suffering v. serious desertion rates (into the 10,000+ per month), and there widespread manhunts for new recruits. Ukraine simply doesn’t have a chance of defeating Russia. Thus, prolonging the slaughter in the hopes of a Russian economic collapse or some revolution isn’t a strategy at all. So, the 1991 or even 2014 borders do not seem possible.

I agree with people who argue that we should not tolerate border changes resulting from offensive wars. I also agree that this is a fast-track to even more conflicts. But, are the Western nations going to declare no further talks, except terms of Russian surrender?

The fall of the “unipolar moment” (a tragedy, in my view) alongside the perceived failures (rightly or wrongly) of the liberal interventionism of the Iraq War and the American pivot towards China meant that I don’t see this a viable option in our world anymore. European powers don’t have sufficient military standing individually or probably even collectively. In England, we’ve only just started talking about military spending increases - following decades of cuts. Brits don’t even want to defend our own nation anymore. Recent ipsos polling in the UK shows “almost half (48%) of Britons say they are no circumstances where they would be willing to take up arms for Britain”.

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Mr Gideon Rachman, a staunchly anti-Putin columnist, writing in “Trump, Putin and the future of Ukraine” (FT, 11 Aug 2025) had an interesting point to make:

War is unpredictable. But the most convincing analyses I have seen are that Ukraine is slowly losing — with the country’s manpower problem on the frontline becoming steadily more acute. That means that a complete breakdown in talks and a continuation of the war would probably be better for Russia than Ukraine.

Kyiv’s position that no territory can be ceded is principled — but also unrealistic as things currently stand. The critical distinction is between de facto and de jure concessions of territory.

A legal recognition of Russia’s forcible annexation of Ukrainian territory is rightly unacceptable to Ukraine, the EU and the UK. But a de facto recognition of Russian occupation of some territory as a brutal reality — in the context of a broader peace deal — may be necessary. The Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic states after 1940 was never legally recognised by the US and most European countries. But it was a fact of life, until, eventually, the Baltic states regained their independence.

Thinking more broadly about the future of Ukraine, the key European governments understand that the debate cannot solely be about territory — important though that is. President Alexander Stubb of Finland, an influential player in the current diplomacy, has suggested a useful framework for thinking about the future — drawing on his own country’s experience after fighting two wars with Russia in the 1940s.

The eventual peace treaties did involve Finland conceding about 10 per cent of its territory. Postwar Finland was also compelled to remain a neutral state to avoid antagonising Moscow. But — crucially — Finland retained its legal independence and its democracy. That enabled it to become a prosperous, free and successful country.

Stubb suggests that ensuring Ukraine’s future involves thinking about three issues: independence, sovereignty and territory.

Using that framework — and the experience of Finland — suggests that Ukraine does not have to achieve 100 per cent of its goals in all three areas to emerge from this war with a positive future. If Ukraine can keep its independence and its democracy — then making some de facto territorial concessions might be a painful but acceptable concession.

I agree with Rachman’s analysis vis-a-vis the ceding of territory.

I also think NATO membership should not be allowed for conventional realist reasons.

He also goes on to explain that such a concession cannot conceivably entail a cap on Ukraine’s military strength (apropos Putin’s ceasefire conditions for ending the military offensive):

The question of sovereignty is also crucial. Russia has demanded enormous limits on Kyiv’s freedom to chart its own course — including limits on the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian military, as well as a ban on Ukraine’s membership of Nato and possibly the EU.

Ukraine clearly cannot accept any military limits that might damage the country’s ability to defend itself. But if Kyiv is allowed to push on with its drive for EU membership then the question of Nato might be taken off the table for a while — particularly given that the political reality is that Nato membership for Ukraine seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

One clear danger at the Alaska summit is that Putin has thought very hard about all these issues for some time. Trump, as ever, will be more interested in claiming a triumph than in the tedious nitty-gritty of a deal. 

But any Alaska agreement is likely to be the start rather than the end of a process. The Ukrainians and Europeans know that they need to humour Trump and play the long game. It is not a great option. But it is the best they have got.