The Gaza aid crisis

The Gaza aid situation is v. serious. While no famine yet, we may be approaching it quite quickly. The prolonged and uneven distribution of aid is going to give rise to severe malnutrition - esp. among the most vulnerable in the Gazan population.

As Emanuel Fabian writes in the ToI, the problem is distribution. There are almost 1,000 aid trucks sitting at the Gaza-side of Kerem Shalom crossing of the border. They are not getting distributed - either by the GHF or UN.

As a bit of a recap, there are two means of delivering aid to Gaza:

1. Directly to the population in Israeli-secured distribution centers - The IDF simply cannot distribute the aid. That would mean putting soldiers into a v. confrontational situation. They would be surrounded by thousands of Gazans; inevitably leading to clashes and attacks. This is why the GHF was created. In an earlier blog post, I thought this might actually be a solution. But, it’s main problem is not nearly enough distribution points (with only 4 centers). You’d need a safe and secure location close enough to the local population. Then, you need the soldiers, security contractors, equipment and engineering to build & secure the sites. Those distribution centers need to be controlled, managed and defended as Hamas is doing everything to undermine them. They’re being disrupted by gunfire and deaths, and involve long lines. An aid station needs to take in thousands of people per hour, and you can’t search them all. Nevertheless, the GHF have been delivering millions of meals per day (which is why there is no famine).

2. Into Hamas controlled territory - The delivery to areas controlled by Hamas is not what GHF does, but others do it. Previously, if the UN sends their drivers, then part of it gets looted on the way and the remainder goes to Hamas. Hamas uses it for their fighters or selling it to Gazan population at exorbitant prices (thereby gaining recruitment money to get more fighters) or plain recruitment-for-food. Earlier in this war, the UN told Israel that it had to secure the convoys of aid going into Gaza. However, when the IDF did that, Hamas combatants (in civilian clothing) mingled with the civilians coming for the aid; then started shooting at the IDF soldiers. The soldiers shoot back. The narrative became: “Israel is shooting civilians coming for aid.” So then, Israel stopped securing the convoys. The problem now is that the UN and aid organizations don’t want to distribute aid into Gaza without the security of the IDF for fear of Hamas. But, when Israel does secure the aid, they can’t protect it from Hamas because of those civilians. And whose fault is that? You guessed it .... Israel!! Not the fault of Hamas.

The waiting aid convoys are supposed to be taken by various aid groups & UN for delivery; and, as the ToI article makes quite clear, it’s about Hamas:

The official said that the UN has made requests that COGAT cannot agree to concerning the deliveries, such as demanding that Hamas police escort the convoys, or that they be allowed to bring in communication devices that Israel fears could end up in the terror group’s hands.

This is not about starving people. This is a power struggle opposing Israeli measures to stop the aid being used to implicitly strengthen Hamas. Hamas’s remaining power and danger is directly related to its control over the aid delivery. Hamas needs to make getting aid from people other than them dangerous, so they can maintain their monopoly and thus power. As Ben Farmer, Melanie Swan and Iona Cleave writing in “How Gaza’s aid crisis broke Hamas and starved the Strip“ (Telegraph) have explained the new GHF aid program has seriously debilitated Hamas:

It has also caused Hamas’s worst financial crisis in decades, Israeli officials report. The terror group has been unable to pay its fighters or repair its network of tunnels and hideouts beneath the Strip. Cash shortages have also left Hamas reportedly unable to pay salaries for police or ministry employees. Money reserves amassed before, or during the early stages of, the war have run short, while Israeli strikes have devastated the leadership and fractured its grip on the besieged territory. Hamas for years received large sums from Iran, Qatar and others, and was also able to tax cross-border commerce. Israel has long alleged that Hamas also made money by seizing and selling international aid entering Gaza, though this has been denied by the United Nations and aid agencies. That income ended, officials say, when Israel imposed a blockade in March, and then began using the GHF, set up jointly by the US and Israel, to run aid hubs and bypass UN-run distributions.

Perhaps the next stage would be a humanitarian city, like Rafah, in allowing much easier delivery since Hamas is not there.